

## **EXHIBIT 4B**

Ex. 121 at 2. On May 28, 1998, Ahmer wrote to another BIF Board Member Jamal Nyrbe (sometimes spelled "Nyrabeah"):

[W]e have a mission statement now and the purpose of having a written document stating our direction is to avoid exactly what we would like to do now: going off in different directions. Kosovo does not fit into our field of work and this is clear from the beginning. As we have decided we are not a relief organization rather a dawah organization for countries where the islamic (sic) identity of the Muslims is at risk. And when we would be making this dawah, we would also take care of some of the needs of the people.

Ex. 122. A few days later, Ahmer provided Nyrbe with a letter attaching BIF's private and public mission statements:

Mission Statement "A"

With the pleasure of Allah as the sole motivation and within the guidelines set by the Shariah, the mission of Benevolence International Foundation is to make Islam supreme on this Earth.

Ex. 123 at 1-2. A computer at BIF's Illinois office also contained an electronic document stating BIF's true mission, titled "Mission Statement (INTERNAL USE ONLY)" and stating "[T]he mission of Benevolence International Foundation is to make Islam supreme on this Earth." Ex. 124 (emphasis in original); *see also* Ex. 125 ("[T]he mission of Benevolence International Foundation is to establish Islam on this Earth.")

However, BIF's public mission statement differed:

"Mission Statement"

BIF will strive to empower Muslims whose Islamic identity is collectively threatened by wars or other causes . . . and would address the humanitarian needs of such Muslims if any.

Ex. 123 at 3; *see also* Ex. 126 at 2 (memorandum on October 18, 1998, from Ahmer stating that BIF's website had to be changed to include its new "final" public mission statement: "BIF will strive

to empower Muslims in its area of operation to lead Islamically principled lives both individually and collectively and to alleviate their sufferings to the best of its capacity.”)

In July 1998, defendant Arnaout met with others on BIF’s board, including Nyrbe, and again discussed BIF’s non-public mission:

- 12.0 The mission statement was finalized and it is attached.
- 12.1 It was furthermore decided that all of the work of the Foundation would be decided according to the mission statement.
- 12.2 The CEO will be responsible for making a study of all projects in light of the mission statement and submit a report on the projects’ compliance with the mission statement. By April 1st, 1999 all the projects must be altered to conform to the mission of BIF and the ones that can’t be changed would be shut down.

- 13.0 Br. Enaam will submit a proposal about the orphan sponsorship in the countries in which BIF doesn’t have an office. The proposal will demonstrate as to how these sponsorship programs are in line with the Vision and Mission of BIF.
- 14.0 To sometime have a pure relief project without Dawah if it can be proven that it is necessary for the successful operation of other Dawah projects.

Ex. 127 at 3.

Ahmer prepared “A General Fundraising Proposal” for defendant Arnaout dated June 17, 1999, reiterating that BIF was not primarily a relief organization: “[A]s decided in our new mission, we have effectively moved away from pure relief work and the money which is available for just crisis is no longer that readily available for us.” Ex. 128 at 2.

BIF made efforts to distance itself – on paper – from the internal mission shortly after Ahmer’s “A General Fundraising Proposal.” Minutes of a BIF Board Meeting dated June 22, 1999 state: “The mission statement was discussed in details and it was decided to keep the mission with the understanding of the board, that BIF is, a relief organization. The board did not agree with the present understanding of Mr. Ahmer.” Ex. 129. The minutes add: “The board accepted the

resignation of Mr. Ahmer from the board." *Id.* Ahmer later informed defendant Arnaout that the minutes had been "edited for our legal books." Ex. 130 at 1.

Minutes from a meeting attended by Ahmer, Nyrbe and defendant Arnaout two days later state:

It was decided that;

1. Suleman will take another look at the letter that has to be sent to the people to whom he explained this mission . . . .
2. I [Ahmer] will try to make sure that this letter can't be used against BIF . . . .
4. For the officers in BIF who know this mission, I will let them read the letter for the people who know our mission and let them come back to me with questions. . . .

Ex. 131.

As those minutes indicate, defendant Arnaout was apparently concerned that Ahmer told untrustworthy people about BIF's non-public mission. Ahmer explained to defendant Arnaout in an undated e-mail:

Like I told you before, I have not made any public announcement of the mission rather was talking about it privately to people. I consider the communities in which these people reside as the communities which in general are introduced to this mission as most of these people are very influential in their respective communities.

Ex. 132. However, a memorandum from Ahmer to defendant Arnaout on August 11, 1999 (after Ahmer was going to resign) reveals that BIF and defendant Arnaout had not eliminated or modified its non-public mission. Ex. 133. In that memorandum, Ahmer wrote:

[W]hen brother Jamal [Nyrbe] was here I discussed with him a matter regarding the public and private mission of BIF.

\* \* \* \* \*

[A] Muslim in his community receives the one you have made for the public which says that the mission is to make lives of people more comfortable, any sensible person can easily see that these two statements are not a difference of understanding rather they are two completely opposite statements.

\* \* \* \* \*

If you go back to last year, when we talked about having two statements there were actually the same statements just the wording for the public was to be a little light and not so upfront and assertive. But in this case, the one you claim to have it for the board and the one for the public is completely different.

*Id.* at 1-2.

Nevertheless, on approximately October 15, 1999, Ahmer wrote a letter stating:

I am writing to all such individuals – a select group – who I had discussed with and explained the mission of BIF in finer details and believe that they had understood me clearly.

\* \* \* \*

Based on this realization, the board has decided to maintain the prior position and entity of BIF, which is that BIF is primarily a relief organization and would get involved with Dawah work when it deems it proper as opposed to the mission that I had shared with you which is that BIF would essentially be a Dawah organization doing relief as an obligation when needed.

Ex. 134 (emphasis in original).

Despite Ahmer's resignation, BIF's non-public mission remained the same. An employee of BIF who knew BIF's true mission recorded months later on January 28, 2000 in a notebook recovered from BIF's Illinois office: "Mission Statement (2) 1. Hardcore make Islam Supreme on Earth". Ex. 135 (parentheses in original). In another note recovered from BIF's Illinois office a BIF employee wrote: "That is our mission—Lying to the people." Ex. 136 (emphasis in original). These sentiments were echoed in another handwritten note at BIF: "unwritten law no matter how poor/sick – first priority is for mujahideen". Ex. 137 at 9.

Moreover, defendant Arnaout reiterated Ahmer's "A General Fundraising Proposal" of June 17, 1999 with his own "A General Fundraising Proposal" in January or June (the month is partially illegible) 2000. Ex. 138. In that memorandum, like Ahmer, defendant Arnaout stated:

The big problem is our move away from Relief. As decided last year in our new mission, we have effectively moved away from pure relief work, and the money which is available for just crises was no longer that readily available. (The Kosovo issue was the best example).

*Id.* at 2.

Also in 2000, BIF employees noted that with respect to presentations to the public:

Sister Dina made the same point as Br. Mohammed as well as suggesting Br. Khalil to stick to the official explanation of who BIF is, as stated by published materials and our mission statement. We are a non-profit, non-political humanitarian relief agency. . . . We are not a dawah organization or affiliated to any Islamic organizations. We happen to be Muslim and the countries we work in, happen to be Muslim. But we are not a 'religious non-profit' like Habitat for Humanity which is a 'Christian based' operation.

\* \* \* \*

Sister also noted the importance of taking precautionary measures to protect BIF. Br. Muzaffar brought up the point that it has to be made clear to people that our role in the UMMAH is a relief organization and no Dawah based and the differences between them.

Ex. 139 (emphasis in original).

As the statements above establish, much thought went into BIF's effort to portray its mission falsely to the public.

#### H. BIF's Efforts in Sudan

As stated above, BIF maintained in its Illinois office a Sudan file containing a BIF report that explained that from its first day BIF aimed to support *jihad* and *mujahideen*, by assisting in military and logistical support, and providing medical care for *mujahideen* and caring for families of *mujahideen*. The report states:

By the grace of Allah, the services of the BIF in the Sudan started in May 1991, after the agreement of *the base* in Sudan with the Sudanese Government. The BIF was able in a short span of time to occupy a distinguished place among the organizations which work in the relief and service work in the country, and the tawfiq is from Allah (SWT).

Ex. 118 at 7 (emphasis added). The report does not explain who "the base" is that reached an agreement with the Sudanese government in May 1991. However, at that time, as discussed above, Usama bin Laden and *al Qaeda* relocated from Afghanistan to Sudan, where they operated in partnership with elements of the Sudanese government, specifically the Sudanese intelligence service

and the ruling National Islamic Front. Literally translated from Arabic to English, "al Qaeda" means "the base."

In a bulletin on BIF letterhead titled "Eight Years of Benevolent Work," defendant Arnaout stated:

BIF is currently active in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Croatia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Sudan, Tajikistan and Yemen. . . . BIF is funded solely from the donations of concerned Muslims.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### SUDAN PROJECTS

For the past five years, BIF has provided millions of dollars in aid to Sudan, especially for the people of the war-torn south. BIF has assisted in resettling thousands of refugees and has provided food, medicine, clothes and shelter.

Ex. 140.

Although undated, the bulletin likely was written in 1995. It celebrates "eight years" of BIF's work, and as discussed above, on some materials BIF claims to have begun its work in 1987 (while on other items it claims to have established in 1992).

BIF also included the mailing address and telephone number of its Sudan office on various versions of its letterhead, including the letterhead of BIF's Canada office. Ex. 141. Moreover, BIF noted in solicitations (in addition to the "Eight Years of Benevolent Work" bulletin) that it worked in Sudan. Ex. 142. A 1999 "Agenda for Enaam" listing defendant Arnaout's responsibilities included "Approve the budget for all BIF" and "Coordination with BIF Sudan." Ex. 143 at 1 and 7.

In a detailed report on its Sudan office, which describes BIF "first, before the establishment of the Sudan Office, and second after the establishment of the Office," BIF explained that "from its first day," its goal was to support *jihad* and *mujahideen* by assisting with military and logistical

[REDACTED]

support, providing medical care in the field, providing training and running camps, providing dawah, looking after the families including children of *mujahideen*, and providing moral and political support for *mujahideen*. Ex. 118 at 1.

After noting BIF's historical success in supporting *jihad* and *mujahideen*, as well as some of BIF's weaknesses, the report continues:

The Foundation came to the Sudan without any preparation. It came carrying its general objectives and it was consequently under influence by the new political and security circumstances immediately after the resurrecting of the Sunnah of Jihad in the Sudan. It formed a close union with the popular defense force on many fronts:

- Meeting over the strategic and detailed objectives.
- Meeting over the management and financial aspects.
- Meeting over the programs and work accomplishment aspects:
  - The training camps experience.
  - The "Ribat Al-khail" Project.
  - The "Mugheeraati Subhan" Operation.
  - The information and media planning.
  - The medical teams accompanying the military operations.
  - The Muglad Hospital.
  - The Kadugly Hospital.
  - The Naw Hospital.
  - The armored battalion of "Waleed".

In addition to all the above, the work domain and the selection of workers was under direct influence of the military think-tank. The general plan was from the beginning tied to the notion of operating along the confrontation lines and according to three stages. This was to be followed by a gradual advance towards the south. Upon consecutive victory achievements after "Saif El-'Ubud", an urgent need appeared for:

- Maintaining a direct presence in the security hot spots.
- Maintaining a humanitarian presence by an international organization which found itself in the midst of a complicated political struggle in the south.

It was therefore essential to take all the measures and precautions in dealing with military events as dictated by the first point above, as well as on the non-military side as required by the second need.

*Id.* at 2-3 (emphasis in original). The Arabic name for the “popular defense force” in Sudan referred to in the BIF report is *Difaar al Shabi*.

The report explains that BIF eventually “separat[ed]” from the “popular defense,” although it maintained “close contacts” with it. *Id.* at 3. Because of their separation from the popular defense and “the economic and political effects of the Gulf War,” BIF’s officials were “led to think in two directions”: 1) “investment”; and 2) “looking for support in other international horizons, while associating ourselves with, and taking along, the humanitarian elements and the programs of various organizations.” *Id.* at 3. The report then explains that BIF became unfocused and disorganized, lacking “the strategic planning and the high quality programming.” *Id.* at 4-5. Next, the report addressed BIF’s projects in the Sudan, noting that there were significant unanswered questions about the objectives and details of the projects. *Id.* at 5-6.

The report then discusses BIF’s plans for the future:

We are on the verge of a new era in which the BIF looms up on a hostile world. A world which is eager to unleash its onslaught on us, and on our objectives. The BIF has become a big responsibility on our shoulders in front of Allah (S.W.T.) and then in front of the group of founders of this organization, who trusted us after we pledged our good promises to them, and after they saw from us what make them delighted. The big challenge now is, however, that the general aims and objectives be clearly specified in a manner that is comprehensible by all, a manner that unifies our steps and progress so as to make our move, a one strong-man move.

**First:** It is vital for our new mission and approach that the general aim be changed from merely Supporting Jihad and Mujahideen to spreading Islamic Da’wah. We no longer need to argue about the details of the rites that we are going to support and traditions (of the Prophet *salla Allahu aliehi wa sallam*) that we are going to resurrect!!

**Second:** This aim (the above) must be a hidden aim, that we ought to replace by aims that are inclined toward resurrecting the good human values, and guarding human rights, woman rights and children rights.

*Id.* at 6 (emphasis in original).

BIF's Sudan file also contains a quarterly report for its Sudan office for May 31, 1995 to August 17, 1995 documenting humanitarian work (Ex. 144), an "Operational Plan & Budget Balance" for 1995-1996 (Ex. 145), and a series of handwritten reports about BIF's activities in Sudan (Exs. 146, 147, 148, and 149).

In the report on its Juba, Sudan office, BIF notes among its "programs achieved" "supporting the Mujahideen with food and medicine in their departure centers to operations areas." Ex. 146 at 1. Among the "projects achieved" by BIF in Damazin, Sudan, Muhammad Almahdi Abdelbaqui, the "Director of Damazin Mission," states: "Financial and material donations were given to the Mujahideen in the areas of Al-Mazan and Al-Boutej." Ex. 147 at 2. He also notes BIF's substantial *dawah* work. *Id.* at 2-3.

In notes on BIF's Kadugli, Sudan office, BIF describes a visit by Ambassador Melissa (spelled "Milicia" in the report) Wells, a special envoy from the U.S. under President Clinton who worked in Sudan as part of international efforts to bring peace to the country. Ex. 148 and 149. BIF recorded that on June 15, 1994, Ambassador Wells met with the director of BIF's Kadugli office, Ma'moun Muhammad Al-Hasan Bilou who provided her "information about the goals and activities of BIF in Kadugli province." Ex. 148 at 1. Director Bilou told Ambassador Wells

that BIF is a international organization working in the humanitarian fields and provide (sic) free basic services like health care, education, agriculture, mother and child care, and helping the poor families regardless of color or gender. He added that BIF works in coordination with all international organizations in Kadugli like UNICEF, WHO and Red Crescent.

*Id.*; see also Ex. 149 at 1 ("Mr. Bilou: BIF is an international organization accredited by the United Nations and is recognized worldwide. Its humanitarian work includes providing health care,

schooling, and relief to refugees, deportees, and children regardless of their religion, race, or color.”). After this description, the report notes: “Ms. Milicia Wells praised BIF and its efforts to provide humanitarian relief.” Ex. 148 at 1. The report then describes visits by a Dutch Aid delegation, a group from UNICEF, and a group from the American Muslim Friendship organization. *Id.* at 1-2. It does not indicate that BIF informed Ambassador Wells or the organizations in the least bit about its support of *mujahideen* efforts or of *al Qaeda*.

A handwritten BIF “news report” describes Ambassador Wells’s visit and includes questions she asked along with Director Bilou’s answers. Ex. 149. It notes that in response to Ambassador Wells’s question “from where BIF gets the financial support,” Director Bilou stated:

BIF has fundraising offices in the U.S., Canada ((Ottawa)), Qatar ((Doha)), Saudi Arabia ((Jeddah))and other Arab countries. through their offices, BIF collects funds from donors and sends them to Sudan to be spend (sic) on the needy, orphans, the poor, and the deportees. *Id.* at 1-2. Director Bilou also said that BIF works in “Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Burma, Bangladesh and Pakistan.” *Id.* at 2. According to Director Bilou, BIF’s “work in Sudan is located in Kadugli, Damazeen, Al Mujallad, and Juba.” *Id.*

It should also be noted that when the *al Qaeda* leadership returned to Afghanistan from the Sudan in the summer of 1996, BIF in Pakistan promptly became aware of the return of the “Arab leadership.” See Ex. 150 (July 24, 1996, letter to Enaam Arnaout); Ex. 151 (August 23, 1996 “Message from Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula.”).

I. BIF's Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Much of BIF's efforts were focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, defendant Arnaout had a family and residence in the capital, Sarajevo, and BIF had offices in Sarajevo and Zenica. It also at one time had an office in neighboring Croatia.

A BIF folder recovered from the trash outside BIF's Illinois offices in December 2001 contained the following handwritten notations (translated from Arabic):

Donate generously to Benevolence International Foundation because it is:

\* \* \* \* \*

It has field offices in the following:

Europe - Zagreb (Croatia): for relief operations and support of jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Asia - Peshawar (Pakistan) - to support Afghan jihad, participate in huge effort of rebuilding, and helping war casualties

\* \* \* \* \*

America - Chicago - to raise donations and benevolence endowment and deepen volunteer sense among the Muslims and their brothers in disaster areas

\* \* \* \* \*

Contribute with your mujahideen brothers to repel the Crusader-Zionist attack on Muslim lands

\* \* \* \* \*

Steeds of war projects

Hospitals, saving the mujahideen wounded (health care programs), eight

\* \* \* \* \*

Training heralds and repelling Christianization activity.

Ex. 152. "Steeds of war projects" appears to refer to a verse in the Koran which reads: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies[.]"<sup>23</sup>

After the formation of BIF, in 1993 or later, a videotape was produced soliciting funds for *mujahideen* in Bosnia. The videotape states at the outset that "the copying and distribution rights of this product are exclusive to *Lajnatt Al-Birr Al-Islamiah*" and that it cannot be reproduced without

---

<sup>23</sup> The Holy Koran, Surah 8, Verses 60-61.

permission, and that unauthorized reproduction is unlawful. Ex. 153 (transcript of videotape, translated from Arabic). Throughout the video, the logo of LBI, which is nearly identical to BIF's, appears in the corner of the screen, after erupting from Saudi Arabia, depicted on a graphic of Earth. The beginning of the video claims to depict the "first actual recording of the battles which are being fought by the Muslims and the Serbs on the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the facts surrounding the martyrdom of a number of Arab *mujahideen*." *Id.* at 1. Near the end of the video, LBI's logo erupts from a graphic depicting Saudi Arabia on a globe and a voice announces: "*Lajnatt Al-Birr Al-Islamiah* is your trusted hand for the support of the *mujahideen* and the immigrants of the Muslims." *Id.* at 12. After that, a montage is displayed showing among other things a building used by LBI in Saudi Arabia and video of relief work in or near Afghanistan. The tape concludes with graphics displaying various accounts and corresponding numbers, including a general charity account and an account for orphans. A voiceover states near the end: "*Lajnatt Al-Birr Al-Islamiah* – trust and honesty."

Most of the video depicts combat footage and scenes of destruction within Bosnia, clearly designed to appeal to donors who wished to financially support the *mujahideen* fighting in Bosnia. The video also contains a long interview with a Saudi Arabian soldier who describes combat involving *mujahideen*, including the deaths of Abu Zubair al Madani and Abu Abbas al Madani. Also included is footage eulogizing Abu Zubair al Madani and Abu Abbas al Madani, including their burials and shots of their families. Both of these individuals were well-known members of *al Qaeda*.

The entire videotape furthers the conspiracy because it was designed to raise funds for *jihad*. Although it uses LBI's name (charged as part of the BIF Enterprise), it was produced after BIF was formed (based in part on the approximate date of Abu Zubair al Madani's death). Moreover, LBI

did not operate in Bosnia, but BIF did. Both organizations were founded by Adel Batterjee, and their assets were interchangeable.

BIF also maintained in Illinois a receipt from the "Black Swans" commando brigade in Bosnia showing that it received from BIF 300 blankets and 200 pairs of boots on July 21, 1994, which also expressed hope that their collaboration will continue. Ex. 154 (letter typed in Arabic). The receipt is signed by Brigadier Hase Tiric.<sup>24</sup> *Id.*

BIF also had in its Illinois office a receipt from the army in Bosnia dated June 3, 1994, issued to BIF for the donation between 1992 and 1994 of 2000 uniforms, 2000 pairs of shoes, 2500 square meters of plastic or nylon, and ten mass communication stations. Ex. 156. The letter thanked BIF "on their noted assistance and collaboration with this military unit" and hoping that "this mutual collaboration will continue." *Id.*

On December 31, 1994, the Bosnian army requested that BIF provide it with an ambulance. Ex. 157; *see also* Ex. 158 (letter from army commander requesting an ambulance from BIF). Shortly thereafter, a unit commander in the Bosnian army thanked BIF for providing it an ambulance, delivered on January 25, 1995. Ex. 159.

In February 1995, BIF established a sewing center in Tejsan, Bosnia-Herzegovina expressly "for the wives and daughters of Bosnian ["Muslim" is crossed out] soldiers who have died fighting in Bosnia." Ex. 160. BIF noted that "the center takes in 70-75 sisters every 3 months." *Id.*

---

<sup>24</sup> The Black Swans are discussed in the article at Ex. 155 (Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia's Elite Force: Fed, Fit, Muslim," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1995). The article cites Brigadier Tiric, who explained that the Black Swans spend around \$700,000 per month in cash on weapons, equipment and supplies. *Id.* The article states: "He said that some of the funds come through the army's general command but that most come from 'private sources.'" *Id.*

On August 10, 1995, defendant Arnaout wrote a letter thanking donors for contributing over \$250,000 for assistance in two towns in Bosnia. Ex. 161. Defendant Arnaout wrote that BIF is assisting Bosnian refugees "with a view of preserving the precious resources of the Bosnian government as much as possible." *Id.*

In a separate solicitation for funds, titled "We need your help for the people of Srebrinica now!", BIF declared: "Once again in front of the whole civilized world the Muslim town of Srebenica has been allowed to fall." Ex. 162. The letter states: "The Serbs have specifically done this to divert the attention of the Bosnian army which is on the offensive is trying to break the deadly siege of Sarajevo. The offensive must continue!" *Id.* (emphasis in original). The letter then asks for donations in an effort to buy tents for refugees, stating: "This will relieve the burden from the government." *Id.*

As the notes on the folder above indicate, however, BIF's military support in Bosnia during the war was not limited to merely freeing up Bosnian resources to spend on military activity. In a memorandum to defendant Arnaout on November 17, 1995 (three months after the letter from defendant Arnaout discussed above), BIF employee "H. Ghawji" described the delivery of 200 tents from BIF to the Bosnian government in October 1995. Ex. 163 at 1. Ghawji described his meeting with government officials and summarized the government's needs, including a request for humanitarian assistance in establishing factories to generate income for the wounded and families of soldiers killed in the war (referred to as "shahids"). *Id.* at 1-2. Ghawji then wrote:

Now let us go to the army needs: The fifth corpus in the Bihać area need the following:  
Tents, sleeping bags, other equipment for outdoor activities, kitchen sets for camping,  
medicines as antibiotics, bandages, Military shoes, field cars, and foods.

Ghawji's letter discusses future plans in Bosnia, including possibly hiring an individual from Sudan named Naser. *Id.* at 2-4.

At the same time, defendant Arnaout was also keeping well informed of the happenings in the neighboring Zagreb office. See Ex. 163a (letter from Arnaout dated October 31, 1995, telling BIF employees how to handle the Croatian authorities and advising that the Interior Ministry will ask questions about a visitor to Zagreb and to advise that it is a "friend to friend" visit; June 17, 1995, letter to Arnaout advising of an inquiry by the "Black Swan" (incorrectly translated as "black tie") group and a request for ambulances for "units" in Tshin and Tsljnjish; a July 2, 1995, letter from Arnaout that a man named "Hamad" with no beard and mustache will be coming to Zagreb and is to be taken to "brother Haitham" as soon as possible; and a July 3, 1995, letter from a BIF employee in Zagreb indicating that the brother Hamad had arrived and was going to Bosnia the next day; a letter to Arnaout marked "urgent," indicating that the "Institute" should not be contacted as "circumstances are not convenient these days"; an October 8, 1996 letter advising of time and manner of contact to the "Institute"; and a letter in the Illinois files which discusses how to fill out the shipping forms so as not to encounter a problem with Croatian authorities).

On April 30, 1998, the Ljiljan Commerce Group, a Bosnian corporation directed solely by defendant Arnaout (Ex. 164) and part of the BIF Enterprise, wrote to the Bosnian Consulate in Turkey requesting a visa for the entry of Abu Hajar (Mamdouh Salim) into Bosnia, purportedly for a business meeting. Ex. 164. On May 5, 1998, Abu Hajar – who was present for the founding of *al Qaeda*, served on its *shurah* (consultation) council, issued *fatwahs* authorizing violence against America and authorized efforts to obtain uranium for nuclear weapons for *al Qaeda* and had described Bosnia as the base for *al Qaeda* operations in Europe – completed a visa application,

listing his occupation as "Businessman." Ex. 165. That same day, a letter on Ljiljan Commerce Group letterhead was sent to the Metalurg Hotel over defendant Arnaout's signature requesting an apartment for "one of the directors of the organization BIF in Bosnia [.]" Ex. 166.

A receipt from the Metalurg Hotel shows that Salim stayed there from May 7 to May 10, 1998. Ex. 167. The receipt also shows that the Ljiljan Commerce Group paid his bill. *Id.*

In October 1998, BIF's employees in Bosnia responded to questions from BIF about various aspects of BIF's work in Bosnia. In an electronic mail on October 26, 1998, in response to the question "What do you think is the best thing that BIF has done in Bosnia?," the employee responded: "Military training of soldiers during the war[.]" Ex. 168 at 1.

In Bosnia, BIF established an Orphan Sponsorship Program. BIF explained the program to potential donors as follows:

BIF has sponsored thousands of orphans in its eight years of operation and continues to do so in countries as varied as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan

\* \* \* \*

- *Raising the morale of the soldiers:* The reassurance that his child will be taken care of adequately in the case of his death inspires confidence and raises the morale of a soldier. A study that B.I.F. conducted shows that in all areas where an effective orphan sponsorship program has been instituted the morale of the soldiers improves.
- *Freeing up resources for defense:* Caring for orphans requires a sizable investment in financial and human resources, especially close to an area of active conflict. By setting up and administering a successful program, we free up the resources of the Bosnian government to use them for an important task: to ensure that children are not made orphans in the first place (i.e. defense). It must be kept in mind that the war in Bosnia has dramatically escalated and the Muslims have to make the most of all the resources they have.

We hope you can understand by now that your sponsorship means much more than supporting a needy child whose parent(s) have been cruelly snatched away from them. It also represents an opportunity to influence the overall situation on the ground with a statement to the men at the front, '*Don't worry, we'll stand by your dear young ones if something were to happen to you!*'

Ex. 169 at 1-2 (emphasis in original). BIF used reports mirroring this one for more than one year and for sponsorship programs in areas in addition to Bosnia.

On April 10, 1999, Suleman Ahmer completed his "Vision 2013 Proposal" for BIF's Board of Directors. Ex. 119. The report, a blueprint for the "creation of an Islamically empowered generation which understands that the Muslims of Bosnia have to stand-up on their own feet and fare for themselves" concludes that: "The critical mass will come from the 400 orphans that we sponsor and their brothers and sisters. In general we are looking at a pool of around 1000 children to start with." *Id.* at 6. Ahmer suggested that the "recruitment of the children would start from September 1 and the training of the children would start from November 15, 1999." *Id.* at 20.

On April 21, 2001, defendant Arnaout purported to introduce himself to the organization "Bosnia Ideal Future" in a letter from BIF-Sarajevo stating that BIF was going to give its projects to Bosnia Ideal Future. Ex. 170. On May 1, 2001, defendant Arnaout (as a representative of BIF-USA) and Munib Zaharigac (as a representative of "Bosnian Ideal Future", or *Bosanska Idealna Futura*), executed an agreement which stated that BIF-USA would fund Bosnia Ideal Future's projects, and that Bosnia Ideal Future has to submit budgets for projects in advance. Ex. 171. The "new" Bosnian organization used BIF's Sarajevo and Zenica offices as well as its logo (and of course its initials "BIF"). Ex. 172.

On November 9 or 10, 2001, Munib Zaharigac, the director of the Sarajevo office, e-mailed defendant Arnaout about a problem with their books. Ex. 173. Zaharigac explained that about six months earlier, BIF helped a wounded soldier from Sarajevo reconstruct a flat after he and his family were evicted from their home. *Id.* Zaharigac explains that an accountant explained to him and

"Alen" (the director of BIF's office in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina) the laws applying to residential humanitarian organizations. *Id.* Zaharigac explained:

As I had informed you before we couldn't present buying flats as our outcome. Also many other bills we could hardly account as our outcome. Alen suggested making new distributing list of orphans and present it as our outcome. But, if it's able, the easiest solution, I mentioned it before, is that we take the needy amount from your BIF Central Bank account and distribute it for OSP for two months in order to be equal our income and outcome.

*Id.*

In his initial response, defendant Arnaout wrote only: "I did not understand what do you mean in this email?????" *Id.* In response, Zaharigac wrote: "It is impossible that you didn't understand anything in this e-mail even my English is bad (sorry for that)." *Id.* Zaharigac added that he supposes that defendant Arnaout is angry with him for his poor job performance. *Id.*

Zaharigac sent a separate response to defendant Arnaout on November 15, 2001, explaining that countries are looking into who is financing terrorism and some humanitarian organizations finance terrorism. Ex. 174. Zaharigac then wrote: "Now I'm going to inform you about the most important thing about my last letter you didn't understand. We have a big difference between our bank account income and outcome." *Id.* He then explained that about half of BIF's expenditures are not on the books, adding: "We can expect their visit and we should be ready for that, because we spent all this money here but must have the papers of that. Please let me know what you think." *Id.*

On November 16, 2001, defendant Arnaout forwarded Zaharigac's e-mail to Alen Cosic and stated that it appears that Zaharigac is confused about the accounting. *Id.* Defendant Arnaout explained that the way Zaharigac is approaching the problem does not seem correct. Defendant Arnaout instructed Cosic: "Please remind him about our last deal and the things we should follow

in our last meeting[.] No phone calls or emails about this subject any more please." *Id.* Defendant Arnaout concluded by asking Cosic to explain Zaharigac's e-mail. *Id.*

In response, Cosic reiterated that there is a "gap" in BIF's official accounting. *Id.* He wrote that one solution is to send money from BIF in the U.S. to an account in Bosnia that is not BIF's regular account – "that way, official accounting would not have any incomes from abroad and for the next 3-4 months we would 'spend the gap.'" *Id.* Cosic adds that this solution is not a good one because the amount of money is so high that it would be noticed. *Id.* Cosic then explains that he does not want to give all the accounting information to the accountant, and concludes by stating that Zaharigac's problems stem from his limited understanding of English. *Id.* Defendant Arnaout replies by stating that he thinks there is a misunderstanding with Zaharigac, and he will be in Bosnia the following week. *Id.*

On January 15, 2002, Batterjee e-mailed defendant Arnaout to tell Arnaout that he got the update from Dr. Hisham (defendant Arnaout's brother, through whom Arnaout communicated to Batterjee, as discussed below). Ex. 175. Batterjee e-mailed defendant moments later and encouraged him to come to Saudi Arabia for Hajj. Ex. 176. A few days later, defendant Arnaout and Batterjee spoke by telephone and Batterjee requested that Arnaout relocate with his family to Saudi Arabia. Ex. 177.

On February 12, 2002, defendant Arnaout spoke via telephone with his brother Hisham overseas. Defendant Arnaout was obviously well aware of BIF's history in Bosnia. See Ex. 178. Defendant Arnaout told Hisham that "they" took the former director of BIF's Bosnian office "in a special plane" "[t]o Cuba." *Id.* Defendant Arnaout added: "[J]ust tell him [referring to "Abu Sulafa," or Adel Batterjee] ninety-three, ninety-four, and Abu Sulafa will know what you are talking

about.”<sup>25</sup> *Id.* He elaborated: “Yeah, ninety-threes, the director of those days. It means, we, I mean, there is death that we will be swallowing. Meaning, the razor will fall on us, but we do not know how. . . . Yes, in ninety-two and ninety-three, the work there was Abu Sulafa’s. . . . And the work was the type of two-edged razor. So the owner of the job, the director who was on the job there, whom I was responsible for, is now with them. . . . So I mean, after him, after him, after him, after him, after him, after him as long as it takes[.]” *Id.* at 16.

#### J. BIF's Efforts in Chechnya

##### 1. Background

Beginning in or before 1995, BIF worked in Chechnya, an area within Russia that has been consumed by violence between Russian forces and Chechen separatists. As discussed below, BIF’s efforts in Chechnya centered on supporting the *mujahideen* fighting against Russia. BIF Board Member Suleiman Ahmer described Chechnya in a memorandum titled “The embattled innocence: Chechnya.” Ex. 180. The report chronicled Ahmer’s trip to Chechnya as “part of the effort by a local humanitarian organization, BIF, in taking relief to the region.” *Id.* In the report, Ahmer referred to Chechnya as “[o]ne of the last great forts of Islam in the Caucasus.” *Id.*

In describing the conflict, Ahmer explained that “the strategy of the Russians is to seek a comprehensive defeat of the Dudayev’s forces.” *Id.* Ahmer added:

The most ironical yet moving instance for me was to find together the Chechens who fought with the Mujahideen against the Russians in Afghanistan and the Chechens who fought the Mujahideen as Russian soldiers. It brought tears of happiness to my eyes when I shared some time with all of them eating together and talking about Islam. Such are the moments which expose the true strength and greatness of Islam and fill our broken hearts with pride and joy. Sultan, a former Russian soldier, who spent a year in Faizabad (Afghanistan)

---

<sup>25</sup> Defendant Arnaout had previously informed Batterjee that he had been searched at the airport. Ex. 179.

fighting the Mujahideen said that he had returned to wage a Jihad against the Russians with a hope that Allah would forgive the time that he had spent in Afghanistan.

It is difficult to ignore the deep reverence to Islam, the pride and fearlessness that permeates in the whole society. "War is a frequent visitor to our land." remarked a young Chechen, "It doesn't annoy us any more. We have fought Ghazwas [(Chechen term for war) for centuries."

*Id.*

In January 2001, BIF published on [www.benevolence.org](http://www.benevolence.org) the "History BIF in Chechnya."

Ex. 181. After stating that Chechen Muslims declared independence from Russia in December 1994, BIF states:

BIF took an immediate interest in helping the Muslims, and became established in the Vendeno district in March of 1995 through our contact, Shiekh (sic) Fathi.

BIF first project in Chechnya was the distribution of protective shoes to the population. During the war, the Russians were using small camouflage mines called Frog mines. They dropped these mines from the air on roads that refugees used to flee the fighting. The mines created a small enough explosion to blow off a person's foot. BIF distributed \$100,000 worth of protective shoes that would lessen the destructive force and the pain from stepping on the mine, and allow doctors to save the foot rather [than] amputating. Also, BIF immediately transferred medical supplies and equipment from our office in Pakistan to help the Chechens.

In late 1995, we opened an office in Baku, Azerbaijan for the two-fold purpose of helping the Muslims in Azerbaijan who were coming out of a bloody six year conflict with Armenia and to have a staging point to send money and supplies into Chechnya.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the end of 1996, after the Russians had withdrawn from Chechnya, BIF was able to establish a physical office in Chechnya, in a suburb of Grozny called Tashkala. Two native Chechens were hired to run the office and the programs in Chechnya.

*Id.* BIF omitted the facts that the "\$100,000 worth of protective shoes" it purchased were expressly for the *mujahideen*, along with camouflage uniforms, medical equipment and money, as discussed below.

On October 18, 1999, defendant Arnaout recounted the history of Chechnya to a BIF fundraiser, Uwaymir Anjum, describing Sheikh Fathi Mohamed (BIF's initial contact in Chechnya), among others. Around the time defendant Arnaout shared this history, Anjum was actively raising funds for BIF for use in Chechnya. See Ex. 182 (December 7, 1999 fundraising letter). Anjum memorialized defendant Arnaout's statements in a document titled "Daghestan and Chechnya: A Brief Recap of the Islamic Movement". Ex. 183 and 184 (electronic version and hard copy version).

At the outset of his notes, Anjum wrote:

Enaam Arnaout, the CEO of the Benevolence International Foundation, a US-based humanitarian relief organization operating in the Caucus, Central Asia and Balkans, has made six trips to Daghestan/Chechnya area and has collected invaluable information on the history and details of the Islamic movement. Most of this information is collected through personal contacts and log (sic) term relationship (sic) with many key people in the movement.<sup>26</sup>

*Id.* at 1.

With respect to Sheikh Fathi, Anjum recorded:

One greatly significant figure in the Islamic movement in Chechnya is *Sheikh Fathi* (a BIF friend who died recently while Enaam was there). . . . He is one of the most significant figures in the Islamic movement in Chechnya. By profession, he was an electronic engineer and helped the Afghan Jihad through his skills in electronics. He stayed in Afghanistan from 1982 to 1992 and then moved to Chechnya. Coming from Ikhwan-salafi background, he had a broad-based knowledge of Islamic movements.

*Id.* (emphasis in original). According to defendant Arnaout, as recorded by Anjum:

Sh. Fathi was initially with Ikhwan ["Brotherhood"] then he broke off to make his own group since he thought that Ikhwan were too narrow in their approach and more broad and daring approaches have to be adopted. Fathi started receiving Mujahideen, especially Arabs, from other Muslim countries.

---

<sup>26</sup> This example reinforces that defendant Arnaout was part of a longstanding agreement to provide support to *mujahideen* that simply expanded geographically over time but involved the same core set of participants and core goals.

*Id.* Defendant Arnaout continued:

At the time of his death, Sh. Fathi was busy in another great task: organizing and structuring his Islamic group. He died before completing the task of structuring his movement completely.

One of Sh. Fathi's legacies, probably the leader of the group after him, is *Arabi*, a Chechen student of Sheikh Fathi. He commands of a group of about 600 mujahideen situated in the capital to keep a watch on the president to ensure that the president does not blatantly violate Islamic principles.

*Id.*

In addition to Sheikh Fathi, defendant Arnaout described the following individuals:

**Zhdokar Dudayev**, a central figure in the Chechen jihad, was a nationalist initially who became Islamist in 1992 and fought till he died in 1995. He was an army commander.

In the opening years of the 1990s, the Islamic movement found itself strongest Tajikistan and then in Dagestan. Tajikistan, being poverty-stricken and away from the Russian center, was able to keep remnants of its Islamic identity. Daghistanis had a similar advantage: many of them lived in the center of the Islamic world, Hijaz for a long time, preserving, however, their culture and language.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Saif-ul-Islam**, the BIF officer in Chechnya, is an Egyptian lawyer who is very knowledgeable. He also came there through Sh. Fathi.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Shamil Basayev** was another army commander who became surrounded by Sufis. . . . However, lately he was trained and Islamically educated by Khattab the leader of Arab Mujahideen.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Khattab** is a Saudi mujahed who went to Afghanistan when he was 17, fought there till he moved to Tajikistan and later to Chechnya. He saved Chechnya from Russian onslaught during the last war by his great courage and is greatly respected by the Chechens. When the Russians had entered Chechnya and almost took over, he went at their back and attacked after carefully choosing the assault time and place such that the Russians were finally defeated.

*Id.* at 1-2.

The reference to Saif ul Islam is particularly significant as he was a top military leader in *al Qaeda*. Indeed, in 1997, Saif ul Islam was in telephonic contact from Baku, Azerbaijan, with the

*al Qaeda* cell in Nairobi, Kenya, headed by Wadih el Hage who was relaying messages between Saif ul Islam on the one hand and Muhammed Atef (then military commander of *al Qaeda*) and Bin Laden in Afghanistan on the other. Ex. 185.

On March 14, 2000, after he left BIF, Uwaymir Anjum wrote to a BIF employee involved in the Orphan Sponsorship Program:

As for Chechnya, it is almost certain that most of the orphans we are taking money for will not be found after war, and I still feel guilty for not disagreeing more strongly with the decision of continuing receiving the money. The money of the orphans is a great responsibility upon bif and we should do our best to either return the money or find the orphans.

Ex. 186.

**2. X-Ray Machine and Anti-Mine Boots for Chechen Mujahideen**

In the summer of 1995, defendant Arnaout, and others working with the BIF Enterprise, purchased and delivered a mobile x-ray machine and accessories expressly for use by the *mujahideen* fighting in Chechnya, along with \$3200. The delivery of the machine was documented in a detailed report by a BIF employee Syed Sarfaraz (or "Sarfarz") which recounts and his journey and also demonstrates BIF's continuing ties to *Hezb e Islami*. Ex. 187. Moreover, as the report reveals, Essa Abzoutov (or Abzoutove), a contact of the Chechen *mujahideen* in Baku, Azerbaijan, asked Sarfaraz on this visit about BIF procuring anti-mine boots for the *mujahideen*:

The above visit was made by the undersigned on behalf of Benevolence International Foundation and at the request of Mr. Suleman Ahmer, Operations Manager, B.I.F. North America/Pakistan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Having failed on the first two attempts to send the X-Ray unit with other passengers bound for Baku (last minute refusal on the first occasion; cancellation of permission by Custom Authorities second time) no viable alternative was left except that I should carry the unit.<sup>27</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The Unit (a photocopy attached) is made in Shanghai, China. With a brand name of Mednif, Model F-30III-2, this mobile unit has a net weight of 95 Kg.<sup>28</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Finally, got the unit through by assuring the authorities that it was meant for refugee camps of Azerbaijan."

\* \* \* \* \*

Contacted Mr. Gul Mohammad, B.I.F.'s Baku contact who is also a senior representative of Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan in Azerbaijan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Gul Mohammad (G.M.) picked me up at mid-day and made arrangements for my stay at his town office-cum-residence. Attempts were made by us to locate Mr. Essa Abzoutove, contact man of Chechen Logistics Cell in Baku. . . . Spent time reviewing status with G.M. and Dr. Atif Aminee, another senior member/office bearer of Hizb-e-Islami Group in Baku.

\* \* \* \* \*

Accompanied G.M. . . . to the office of Mr. Khasan G. Khazutev, Vice Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic (See copy of his calling card, attached).<sup>29</sup> G.M. Explained to him the purpose of my visit and B.I.F.'s desire to provide financial and material support to the Chechen cause. Mr. Khazutev welcomed B.I.F.'s humanitarian help and assured to become an effective conduit to pass on the proposed aid, cash or kind, most expeditiously to the Mujahideen. After being convinced of our bona fides, he showed us two letters issued by the office of President Dzokhar Dudayev . . . which contained the names of the Chechen based in Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan who were designated to receive the donations in cash or kind. These letters were signed by President Dudayev himself . . . .

---

<sup>27</sup> One of these failed delivery efforts involved Asad Ullah, who, as discussed later in Sarfarz's report, delivered \$3200 to Essa Abzoutov, the person who ultimately received the x-ray machine. In a May 19, 1995, memorandum from Ahmer to "Brother Essa," Ahmer stated: "the X-Ray machine is arriving on Sunday (21-May-1995). The name of the brother who is bringing the machine is Asad Ullah Khan." Ex. 188. That same day, BIF employee Muzaffar Khan prepared a memorandum to "Sister Umme Mohammad" stating that Asad Ullah Khan is traveling on Pakistan International Airlines ("PLA") on May 21, 1995 with an x-ray machine, asking her to convey that to Abzoutov and to have Abzoutov call Gul Mohammad. Ex. 189.

<sup>28</sup> A photocopy of the front page of a brochure or instruction manual was recovered at BIF's Illinois office. Ex. 190.

<sup>29</sup> Khasan G. Khazutev's business card was recovered from BIF's Illinois office. See Ex. 194.

G.M. appreciated our being taken into confidence but discreetly asked for a photocopy of the letters for B.I.F.'s purposes. Mr. Khazuyev, as expected, said it could be considered later.

\* \* \* \* \*

G.M. came to meet me along with Essa and his fellow Mujahid Buda? Essa was visibly moved by B.I.F.'s help by sending the much needed X-Ray machine. Following some discussions, Essa took the unit and gave a proper receipt for it. He indicated that as soon as a viable route/transport is arranged, the unit would be taken to a field hospital in Southern Chechnya. He also acknowledged the receipt of amount given by G.M. (\$3225/- sent through Mr. Asad Ullah and the amount paid to him earlier on by G.M.)<sup>30</sup> G.M. said he would Fax to Suleman Ahmer the receipt of these amounts. The receipt of the unit is also enclosed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Essa also showed interest in anti-mine steel-sole boots for Chechen fighters. He also added that he could arrange funds to purchase these from USA or other sources at a reasonable price.

\* \* \* \* \*

It appears that Suleman Ahmer is making some inquiries about the manufacture/supply of such boots.

\* \* \* \* \*

Visited the main office of Hizb-e-Islami with G.M. and Dr. Atif and I was introduced to Mr. Abdur Rehman, General Manager . . . . These two oversee administrative functions whereas G.M. and Dr. Atif are responsible for external affairs and for coordination with Government Agencies /foreign functionaries etc. Hisb's official lauded B.I.F.'s efforts to help the Chechen's cause and indicated their cooperation in facilitating such efforts in Baku.

\* \* \* \* \*

Met couple of Hisb's Mujahideen. Exchanged views on latest situation; role of B.I.F. in distress areas like Bosnia, Sudan and now Chechnya etc.

\* \* \* \* \*

Met G.M., Dr. Atif and visiting official from Hisb's Peshawar. . . . G.M. briefed him on B.I.F.'s contribution, financial and material, to the Chechen Mujahideen and a desire for continuing support on humanitarian grounds.

\* \* \* \* \*

Met, at G.M.'s house, five veteran Afghan Mujahideen who participated in Nagorno Karabakh conflict against the Armenians. G.M. apprised them of B.I.F.'s humanitarian efforts in Chechnya.

\* \* \* \* \*

---

<sup>30</sup> The \$3200 sent to Abzoutov was discussed in a May 14, 1995 facsimile from Ahmer to Fathi Moharumed (also referred to as Sheikh Fathi, discussed *infra*.) via "Brother Essa," stating: "I hope you have received all the money from Gul Mohammad" and "I am also sending an X-ray machine for the Vidino Hospital." Ex. 191. That note followed a May 2, 1995 handwritten note from Ahmer to defendant Arnaout requesting that defendant Arnaout transfer money to a man in Peshawar, Pakistan and say it is for Gul Mohammed in Baku, Azerbaijan. Ex. 192.